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El Paso, Texas 79968, USA
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Abstract—Usually, fuzzy logic (and multi-valued logics in
general) are viewed as drastically different from the usual 2valued logic. In this paper, we show that while on the surface,
there indeed seems to be a major difference, a more detailed
analysis shows that even in the theories based on the 2-valued
logic, there naturally appear constructions which are, in effect,
multi-valued, constructions which are very close to fuzzy logic.

I. F ORMULATION OF THE P ROBLEM : B RIDGING THE G AP
B ETWEEN F UZZY L OGIC AND THE T RADITIONAL
2-VALUED F UZZY L OGIC
There seems to be a gap. One of the main ideas behind fuzzy
logic (see, e.g., [3], [6], [7]) is that:
• in contrast to the traditional 2-valued logic, in which
every statement is either true or false,
• in fuzzy logic, we allow intermediate degrees.
In other words, fuzzy logic is an example of a multi-valued
logic.
This difference has led to some mutual misunderstanding
between researchers in fuzzy logic and researchers in traditional logic:
• on the one hand, many popular articles on fuzzy logic,
after explaining the need for intermediate degrees, claim
that in the traditional 2-valued logic, it is not possible to
represent such degrees – and thus, a drastically new logic
is needed;
• on the other hand, many researchers from the area of
traditional logic criticize fuzzy logic for introducing – in
their opinion – “artificial” intermediate degrees, degrees
which are contrary to their belief that eventually, every
statement is either true or false.
What we plan to show in this paper. In this paper, we plan
to show that the above mutual criticism is largely based on a
misunderstanding.
Yes, in the first approximation, there seems to be a major
difference between 2-valued and multi-valued logic. However,
if we dig deeper and consider more complex constructions,

we will see that in the traditional 2-valued logic there are, in
effect, multiple logical values.
The usual way of introducing multiple values in 2-valued
logics is based on ideas which are different from the usual
fuzzy logic motivations. However, we show that there is a reasonably natural alternative way to introduce multi-valuedness
into the traditional 2-valued logic, a way which is very similar
to what we do in fuzzy logic.
Thus, we bridge the gap between the fuzzy logic and the
traditional 2-valued fuzzy logic.
Why this may be interesting? Definitely not from the
practical viewpoint; we take simple techniques of fuzzy logic
and we interpret them in a rather complex way.
But, from the theoretical viewpoint, we believe that bridging
this gap is important. It helps to tone down the usual criticisms:
• Contrary to the opinion which is widely spread in the
fuzzy logic community, it is possible to describe intermediate degrees in the traditional 2-valued logic. However,
such a representation is complicated. The main advantage
of fuzzy techniques is that they provide a simply way of
doing this – and simplicity is important for applications.
• On the other hand, contrary to the opinion which is
widely spread in the classical logic community, the main
ideas of fuzzy logic are not necessarily inconsistent with
the 2-valued foundations; moreover, they naturally appear
in these foundations if we try to adequately describe
expert knowledge.
We hope that, after reading this paper, researchers from both
communities will better understand each other.
The structure of this paper. In Section 2, we describe the
usual view of fuzzy logic as a technique which is drastically
different from the usual 2-valued logic. In Section 3, we
remind the readers that in the 2-valued approach, there is
already multi-valuedness – although this multi-valuedness is
different from what we consider in fuzzy logic. Finally, in
Section 4, we show that the 2-valued-logic-based analysis of

expert knowledge naturally leads to a new aspect of multivaluedness, an aspect which is very similar to the main ideas
behind fuzzy logic.
II. F UZZY L OGIC – THE WAY I T I S T YPICALLY V IEWED
AS D RASTICALLY D IFFERENT FROM THE T RADITIONAL
2-VALUED L OGIC
Usual motivations behind fuzzy logic. Our knowledge of the
world is rarely absolutely perfect. As a result, when we make
decisions, then, in addition to the well-established facts, we
have to rely on the human expertise, i.e., on expert statements
about which the experts themselves are not 100% confident.
If we had a perfect knowledge, then, for each possible
statement, we would know for sure whether this statement
is true or false. Since our knowledge is not perfect, for many
statements, we are not 100% sure whether they are true or
false.
Main idea behind fuzzy logic. To describe and process such
statements, Zadeh proposed special fuzzy logic techniques, in
which, in addition to “true” and “false”, we have intermediate
degrees of certainty; see, e.g., [3], [6], [7].
In a nutshell, the main idea behind fuzzy logic is to go:
• from the traditional 2-valued logic, in which every statement is either true or false,
• to a multi-valued logic, in which we have more options
to describe our opinion about he truth of different statements.
From this viewpoint, the traditional 2-valued logic and the
fuzzy logic are drastically different. Namely, these logics
correspond to a different number of possible truth values.
III. T HERE I S A LREADY M ULTI -VALUEDNESS IN THE
T RADITIONAL 2-VALUED F UZZY L OGIC : K NOWN R ESULTS
Source of multi-valuedness: Gödel’s theorem. At first
glance, the difference does seem drastic. However, let us recall
that the above description of the traditional 2-valued logic is
based on the idealized case when for every statement S, we
know whether this statement is true or false.
This is possible in simple situations, but, as the famous
Gödel’s theorem shows, such an idealized situation is not
possible for sufficiently complex theories; see, e.g., [2], [5].
Namely, Gödel proved that already for arithmetic – i.e., for
statements obtained from basic equality and inequality statements about polynomial expressions by adding propositional
connectives &, ∨, ¬, and quantifiers over natural numbers – it
is not possible to have a theory T in which for every statement
S, either this statement or its negation are derived from this
theory (i.e., either T  S or T  ¬S).
We have, in effect, at least three different truth values.
Due to Gödel’s theorem, there exist statements S for which
T ̸ S and T ̸ ¬S. So:
• while, legally speaking, the corresponding logic is 2valued,

in reality, such a statement S is neither true nor false –
and thus, we have more than 2 possible truth values.
At first glance, it may seem that here, we have a 3-valued logic,
with possible truth values “true”, “false”, and “unknown”, but
in reality, we may have more, since:
• while different “true” statements are all provably equivalent to each other, and
• all “false” statements are provably equivalent to each
other,
• different “unknown” statements are not necessarily provably equivalent to each other.
•

How many truth values do we actually have: the notion
of Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. To get a more adequate
description of this situation, it is reasonable to consider the
equivalence relation  (A ⇔ B) between statements A and B.
Equivalence classes with respect to this relation can be
viewed as the actual truth values of the corresponding theory.
The set of all such equivalence classes is known as the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra; see, e.g., [2], [5].
But what does this have to do with fuzzy logic?
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra shows that any sufficiently complex logic is, in effect, multi-valued.
However, this multi-valuedness is different from the multivaluedness of fuzzy logic.
What we do in this paper. In the next sestion, we show that
there is another aspect of multi-valuedness of the traditional
logic, an aspect of which the usual fuzzy logic is, in effect,
a particular case. Thus, we show that the gap between the
traditional 2-valued logic and the fuzzy logic is even less
drastic.
IV. A PPLICATION OF 2-VALUED L OGIC TO E XPERT
K NOWLEDGE NATURALLY L EADS TO A N EW A SPECT OF
M ULTI -VALUEDNESS – A N A SPECT S IMILAR TO F UZZY
Need to consider several theories. In the previous section,
we considered the case when we have a single theory T .
Gödel’s theorem states that for every given theory T that
includes formal arithmetic, there is a statement S that can
neither be proven nor disproven in this theory. Since this
statement S can neither be proven not disproven based on the
axioms of theory T , a natural idea is to consider additional
reasonable axioms that we can add to T .
This is what happened, e.g., in geometry, with the V-th
postulate – that for every line ℓ in a plane and for every point
P outside this line, there exists only one line ℓ′ which passes
through P and is parallel to ℓ. Since it turned out that neither
this statement nor its negation can be derived from all other
(more intuitive) axioms of geometry, a natural solution is to
explicitly add this statement as a new axiom. (If we add its
negation, we get Lobachevsky geometry – historically the first
non-Euclidean geometry; see, e.g., [1].)
Similarly, in set theory, it turns out that the Axiom of Choice
and Continuum Hypothesis cannot be derived or rejected based
on the other (more intuitive) axioms of set theory; thus, they

(or their negations) have to be explicitly added to the original
theory; see, e.g., [4].
The new – extended – theory covers more statements that
the original theory T .
• However, the same Gödel’s theory still applies.
• So for the new theory, there are still statements that can
neither be deduced nor rejected based on this new theory.
• Thus, we need to add one more axiom, etc.
As a result:
• instead of a single theory,
• it makes sense to consider a family of theories {Tα }α .
In the above description, we end up with a family which is
linearly ordered in the sense that for every two theories Tα
and Tβ , either Tα  Tβ or Tβ  Tα . However, it is possible
that on some stage, different groups of researchers select two
different axioms – e.g., a statement and its negation. In this
case, we will have two theories which are not derivable from
each other – and thus a family of theories which is not linearly
ordered.
How is all this applicable to expert knowledge? From the
logical viewpoint, processing expert knowledge can also be
viewed as a particular case of the above scheme: axioms are
the basic logical axioms + all the expert statements statements
that we believe to be true.
• We can select only the statements in which experts are
100% sure, and we get one possible theory.
• We can add statements S for which the expert’s degree
of confidence d(S) exceeds a certain threshold α – and
get a different theory, with a larger set of statements
{S : d(S) ≥ α}.
Depending on our selection of the threshold α, we thus
get different theories Tα .
So, in fact, we also have a family of theories {Tα }α , where
different theories Tα correspond to different levels of the
certainty threshold α.
•

Example. For example, if we select α = 0.7, then:
• For every object x for which the expert’s degree of
confidence that x is small is at least 0.7, we consider
the statement S(x) (“x is small”) to be true.
• For all other objects x, we consider S(x) to be false.
Similarly, we only keep “if-then” rules for which the expert’s
degree of confidence in these rules is either equal to 0.7 or
exceeds 0.7.
Once we have a family of theories, how can we describe
the truth of a statement? If we have a single theory T , then
for every statement S, we have three possible options:
• either T  S, i.e., the statement S is true in the theory T ,
• or T  ¬S, i.e., the statement S is false in the theory T ,
• or T ̸ S and T ̸ ¬S, i.e., the statement S is undecidable
in this theory.
Since, as we have mentioned earlier, a more realistic description of our knowledge means that we have to consider a family

of theories {Tα }α , it is reasonable to collect this information
based on all the theories Tα .
Thus, to describe whether a statement S is true or not,
instead of a single yes-no value (as in the case of a single
theory), we should consider the values corresponding to all the
theories Tα , i.e., equivalently, we should consider the whole
set
def
deg(S) = {α : Tα  S}.
This set is our degree of belief that the statement S is true –
i.e., in effect, the truth value of the statement S.
Logical operations on the new truth values. If a theory Tα
implies both S and S ′ , then this theory implies their conjunction S & S ′ as well. Thus, the truth value of the conjunction
includes the intersection of truth value sets corresponding to
S and S ′ :
deg(S & S ′ ) ⊇ deg(S) ∩ deg(S ′ ).
Similarly, if a theory Tα implies either S or S ′ , then this
theory also implies the disjunction S ∨ S ′ . Thus, the truth
value of the disjunction includes the union of truth value sets
corresponding to S and S ′ :
deg(S ∨ S ′ ) ⊇ deg(S) ∪ deg(S ′ ).

What happens in the simplest case, when the theories are
linearly ordered? If the theories Tα are linearly ordered, then,
once Tα  S and Tβ  Tα , we also have Tβ  S. Thus, with
every Tα , the truth value deg(S) = {α : Tα  S} includes,
with each index α, the indices of all the stronger theories –
i.e., all the theories Tβ for which Tβ  Tα .
In particular, in situations when we have a finite family of
def
theories, each degree is equal to Dα0 = {α : Tα  Tα0 } for
some α0 . In terms of the corresponding linear order
α ≤ β ⇔ Tα  Tβ ,
this degree takes the form Dα0 = {α : α ≤ α0 }. We can thus
view α0 as the degree of truth of the statement S:
def

Deg(S) = α0 .
In case of expert knowledge, this means that we consider
the smallest degree of confidence d for which we can derive
the statement S if we allow all the expert’s statements whose
degree of confidence is at least d.
• If we can derive S by using only statements in which the
experts are absolutely sure, then we are very confident in
this statement S.
• On the other hand, if, in order to derive the statement S,
we need to also consider expert’s statement in which the
experts are only somewhat confident, then, of course, our
degree of confidence in S is much smaller.
These sets Dα are also linearly ordered: one can easily show
that
Dα ⊆ Dβ ⇔ α ≤ β.

In this case:
• the intersection of sets Dα and Dβ simply means that we
consider the set Dmin(α,β) , and
• the union of sets Dα and Dβ simply means that we
consider the set Dmax(α,β) .
Thus, the above statements about conjunction and disjunction
take the form
Deg(S & S ′ ) ≥ min(Deg(S), Deg(S ′ ));
Deg(S ∨ S ′ ) ≥ max(Deg(S), Deg(S ′ )).

This is very similar to the usual fuzzy logic. The above
formulas are very similar to the formulas of the fuzzy logic
corresponding to the most widely used “and”- and “or”operations: min and max. (The only difference is that we get
≥ instead of the equality.)
Thus, fuzzy logic ideas can be indeed naturally obtained
in the classical 2-valued environment: namely, they can be
interpreted as a particular case of the same general idea as the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra.
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